Final Report on the Sinking of Cargo Ship Verity: A Preventable Tragedy

More than two years after the cargo ship *Verity* sank following a collision in the German Bight, the UK’s Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) has released its final report, concluding that the loss of five lives was entirely preventable. The incident occurred on October 24, 2023, when the Isle of Man-registered *Verity* collided with the Bahamas-flagged bulk carrier *Polesie* in a busy traffic separation scheme, approximately 12 nautical miles southwest of Helgoland. The collision caused *Verity* to sink within minutes, leaving only two crew members alive.

MAIB Chief Inspector Andrew Moll stated, “This accident was wholly avoidable.” He emphasized that neither vessel adhered to collision regulations, allowing for dangerously close passing when it was unnecessary. The report highlights a critical failure in navigation and communication that led to this tragic outcome.

A Failure to Act—Until It Was Too Late

The investigation revealed that both vessels were on a clear crossing course with sufficient sea room. According to the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, *Verity* was designated as the give-way vessel and was required to take early and decisive action to avoid a collision. However, the crew failed to do so.

Instead of taking appropriate measures, the officers of both ships allowed them to close in to dangerously short distances, with a closest point of approach of just 0.5 nautical miles. The report indicates that the small, incremental course changes made using autopilot were insufficient to signal a clear intent to avoid a collision. When action was finally taken, it was too late. The officer on *Verity* attempted to pass ahead of the larger *Polesie*, a maneuver deemed risky and contrary to regulations. Meanwhile, *Polesie* altered its course, further complicating the situation.

Even in the final moments before impact, the report found that a decisive maneuver could have averted the collision. At 4:52:55 a.m., *Polesie* had the opportunity to turn away from *Verity*, but the officer continued to make minor autopilot adjustments instead of taking manual control.

Vessel Traffic Services Under the Microscope

Germany’s vessel traffic services (VTS) were also scrutinized in the investigation. While VTS operators monitored the traffic, their first intervention came too late and lacked the urgency needed to prevent the collision. The VTS was operating on a duplex VHF channel, which required an assistant to relay messages between the two ships, consuming critical seconds as they approached each other.

By the time the VTS supervisor issued a strong instruction to *Polesie*, the vessels were already too close for effective external intervention. Although the officer complied with the instruction, it was too late to avoid the collision.

The report suggests that earlier direct communication via VHF radio could have clarified intentions and potentially broken the dangerous stalemate that developed. However, this communication never occurred. When *Polesie* struck *Verity* at 4:55 a.m., the damage was catastrophic. The flooding overwhelmed *Verity*, sinking it before the crew could don lifejackets or immersion suits. The cold water and lack of survival equipment left little chance for survival.

Search and rescue operations were promptly initiated by German authorities, but the investigation faced challenges due to the absence of a voyage data recorder on *Verity*, which was not mandated by current regulations. This absence hindered the ability to fully reconstruct the events leading to the collision.

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Recommendations—but No New Rules

The MAIB issued several safety recommendations, emphasizing the importance of watchkeeping discipline and collision-avoidance fundamentals. German authorities were urged to review their duplex VHF channel usage and intervention protocols, while the Isle of Man Ship Registry was encouraged to advocate for expanded voyage data recorder requirements at the International Maritime Organization.

Notably, the investigation did not call for changes to existing collision regulations. The report concluded that the regulations were adequate but simply not followed. “Give-way vessels must take early, substantial action that is clearly visible to others and results in passing at a safe distance,” Moll stated.