U.S. Navy’s Medium Landing Ship Program Faces Setbacks
The U.S. Navy’s Medium Landing Ship (LSM) program, a critical component for future military operations in the Pacific, is currently stalled. This vessel is seen as essential for transporting Marines to remote islands, particularly in the context of a potential conflict with China. Recent reports indicate that Navy leaders have halted progress due to unexpectedly high cost estimates from industry partners. This pause raises significant questions about how the Marine Corps will implement its Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (EABO) strategy, which relies heavily on the LSM for its island-hopping missions.
The Role of the Medium Landing Ship
The Medium Landing Ship, previously known as the Light Amphibious Warship (LAW), is designed to deliver Marine forces directly onto beaches without the need for established port facilities. This capability is vital for executing missions that involve firing anti-ship cruise missiles at adversarial forces and gathering intelligence. The LSM is intended to transport mobile, platoon-sized Marine units to strategically important islands, particularly in areas like the southern Japanese islands and the Philippines. These operations are part of a broader sea-denial strategy aimed at countering Chinese military presence in the South China Sea and East China Sea.
Navy and Marine Corps leaders have proposed acquiring between 18 to 35 LSMs, each measuring between 200 to 400 feet in length. These ships would be crewed by approximately 70 sailors and would provide around 8,000 square feet of deck cargo space. They are expected to carry 50 Marines and nearly 650 tons of equipment. Additionally, the LSM will feature a helicopter landing pad and various defensive armaments, including two 30mm guns and six .50-caliber machine guns. With a cruising range of 3,500 nautical miles and a service life of 20 years, the LSM is envisioned as a versatile platform for modern amphibious operations.
Financial Hurdles and Strategic Implications
Despite the urgent need for the LSM, the Navy recently canceled a request for proposals to build the vessel after industry bids came in significantly higher than expected. Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition Nickolas Guertin noted that the Navy had anticipated a more manageable cost but was faced with a “much higher price tag” upon soliciting bids. The proposed Fiscal Year 2025 budget indicated that the first LSM would cost around $268 million, with average costs dropping to approximately $156 million by the seventh and eighth ships. However, initial estimates had suggested a price range of $100 million to $150 million per ship.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has also highlighted the variability in cost estimates, suggesting that the LSM could range from $340 million to $430 million per ship for an 18-ship program. This discrepancy underscores the challenges the Navy faces in balancing affordability with the operational capabilities required for the LSM. As the Marine Corps continues to emphasize the importance of the LSM for its EABO strategy, both branches are now working to revise the acquisition strategy to address these financial concerns.
The LSM program’s delays reflect a broader tension between the Navy and Marine Corps regarding amphibious capabilities. While the Marines advocate for a more numerous and cost-effective fleet, the Navy is focused on developing higher-end capabilities. This disconnect complicates the procurement process and raises concerns about the U.S. military’s readiness to respond to potential threats in the Pacific, particularly with the looming possibility of conflict with China. As both branches navigate these challenges, the future of the LSM program remains uncertain, highlighting the need for a cohesive strategy that aligns operational requirements with budgetary realities.
